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ABSTRACT  
Royalties, rents and other material benefits from 
mining ventures have been of interest to development 
discussions. These benefits are important to all stake-
holders but the first mining agreement in the Solomon 
Islands only accommodated a tiny percentage of the gross 
value of gold and silver produced as the mining lease to 
landowning groups. The questions that led me to the 
Gold Ridge mine and surrounding communities on 
Guadalcanal in 2007 and 2010 are: (i) Can royalties 
from the mine be sustainable agents to improve people’s 
livelihoods? (ii) To what extent have royalty payments, 
licence fees and rents from mines impacted on local Solo-
mon Islanders’ lives? (iii) How do mining agreements 
and courts of law do or do not safeguard local social 
capital and the environment? In analysing the data, the 
processes of negotiating mining agreements; movement 
and resettlement of people; livelihood and gendered 
opportunities offered by the mine; and the state’s role 
in the mine are discussed in this paper. Moreover, the 
paper responds to the three questions above and assesses 
the sustainability of mining royalties and the role of 
the modern state and processes in the Solomon Islands 
mining sector.
Keywords relocation, landowners, livelihoods, royal-
ties, mining
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The Gold Ridge1 mine project covers a leased 
area of 32 square kilometres and it also has a Spe-
cial Prospecting Licence (spl) area of 132 square 
kilometres on the island of Guadalcanal (asg, 
2007: 4). It commenced production in October 
1996 until June 2000 when the mine operators 
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address their concern. However, ten years down 
the road in 1988, Guadalcanal people again peti-
tioned the state on their concerns after multiple 
murders by settlers in a Guadalcanal village. This 
time, one item prominent on the agenda is the 
need for more autonomy by provinces to deter-
mine their own destinies by benefiting more from 
their resources(Gatu, 1988). The government re-
ceived the petition and again promised to address 
the issues of concern. Nothing really eventuated 
and another ten years on, another set of demands 
was submitted to the state by the Guadalcanal 
Provincial Assembly after another murder of a 
Guadalcanal woman (Guadalcanal Provincial 
Assembly, 1998). It was alleged that the petition 
triggered anger and resentment in some Guadal-
canal youths who formed a militant group, the 
Guadalcanal Revolutionary Army (gra) later 
called the Isatabu Freedom Movement (ifm) to 
harass and evict migrant settlements, especially 
from the neighbouring island of Malaita, out of 
rural Guadalcanal, from plantations and other 
establishments on the island. The settler popula-
tion from Malaita responded to the intimidation 
and harassments by forming a counter militia 
force, the Malaita Eagle Force (mef). With the 
help of some members of the Police Force, they 
were introduced to the outside 
world through the labour trade 
(black birding), World War II 
experiences and the introduction 
of waged labour through planta-
tion development (see Bennett, 
1987). The movement of people 
between islands in response to 
plantation and urban administra-
tive centres continued to increase 
even after flag independence.
The Protectorate also intro-
duced modern laws based on the 
British laws. Prominent among 
these were laws relating to land. 
Land titling and the possibility 
of leasing land for «development» 
activity was a feature of the mo-
dern tenure, something totally 
different from traditional land 
tenure that is based on commu-
nal ownership. A controversial 
regulation called the «Solomon 
Islands Wasteland Regulation» 
saw the alienation of huge areas 
on many islands to planta-
tion owners and other business 
people. A bulk of these is found 
on Guadalcanal where huge coco-
nut plantations were established. 
The aftermath of World War II 
also saw the shift of the govern-
ment’s headquarters from Tulagi 
in the Central Islands group to 
Honiara on Guadalcanal. Urban migration and 
the movement of people from other islands to 
Guadalcanal were exacerbated and this brings 
with it all the social and economic ills of mo-
dern society like crimes, poverty and disputes 
over land. The indigenous people of Guadalca-
nal also felt exploited by the state because of the 
assumption that they gave more than the other 
provinces in terms of revenue from their land 
and resources. Unfortunately, they felt that pro-
vinces with fewer contributions to the national 
economy are benefitting more from Guadalcanal 
resources and employment opportunities crea-
ted there. Moreover, migrants allegedly failed to 
respect the traditions and cultures of the indige-
nous people of Guadalcanal and have settled ille-
gally on customary land owned by Guadalcanal 
tribes and clans. This fear of the «outsider» is also 
discussed by Filer (1990: 7) in the case of the 
Bougainville copper mine and is therefore not 
peculiar to Guadalcanal.
These frustrations and feeling of being exploited 
were demonstrated through various peaceful 
petitions and demonstration by Guadalcanal 
people. The first one was held in 1978 just before 
independence (Guadalcanal Provincial Council, 
1978). The state responded and promised to the 
Figure 1. – Map of Solomon Islands (source: ssgm, anu, 2014)
In this research, the focus is primarily on the 
experiences of landowning groups and the So-
lomon Islands Government. Official company 
documents and agreements are also consulted to 
indicate the company position.
A variety of interrelated methods were used to 
access information from the different actors in 
the natural resources sector. The first and most 
used method is individual face to face interview. 
Appointments were made with respondents and 
with the help of lists of questions specifically tar-
geting three different groups in the landowning 
communities, interviews were conducted with 
individuals. In a number of situations, indivi-
dual interviews were not possible so focus group 
discussions or workshops were carried out to 
gauge group views. Such focus group discussions 
were held separately for males, females, youths 
and community leaders. Apart from interviews 
and focus group discussions, observations and 
talanoa or tok stori were relied upon to verify 
and confirm or disregard information obtained 
in the interviews and focus group discussions. 
Talanoa (tok stori in Melanesian pidgin) accor-
ding to Vaioleti: 
«[…] can be referred to as a conversation, a talk, 
an exchange of ideas or thinking, whether formal or 
informal. It is almost always carried out face-to- face.» 
(Vaioleti 2006: 23) 
These conversations also produced rich infor-
mation used to verify materials provided by other 
informants. 
Historical and Political Context of the Study
Before venturing into the experiences of lan-
downers with the state, state institutions and 
company, it is important to briefly contextualise 
the history and political context in which the 
mine was established. Some accounts attribu-
ted the name of the country, Solomon Islands, 
from a gold nugget that the first European to 
visit the Solomon Islands, Alvaro de Mendana, 
picked from one of the river’s mouths along the 
Guadalcanal coast. He called them the Solomon 
Islands in «the mistaken hope of mineral riches 
matching those of the biblical king» (John-
son and Powles, 2012: 140). Of course this is 
a contentious piece of history but the point is 
that, interest in gold and mineral deposits in the 
Solomon Islands started way back in those very 
early days of contacts with the outside world. 
The declaration of Solomon Islands as a British 
Protectorate in 1893 gave way the opening up 
of the islands that are now called Solomon Is-
lands to the outside world. Solomon Islanders 
abandoned operations due to social tensions 
between indigenous Guadalcanal people and 
Malaita settlers (Nanau, 2008). The Asia Miner 
reported that in the first 22 months the mine 
was in operation: 
«[…] [it] produced 210,000 ounces of gold and was 
the source of 30% of the Solomon Islands gdp.» (Asia 
Miner, 2007)
The mine, the first in the country, anticipated 
losses to homes, spaces, environment and liveli-
hoods and this necessitated the need to negotiate 
royalty and land rents and other compensation 
arrangements. Such negotiations take time and 
agreements initially reached are often amended 
to suit prevailing circumstances. Manegulai2 
(pers. com., 3 July 2007) indicated that it took 
about 30 years of prospecting and 17 years of 
negotiations to establish the Gold Ridge mine. 
He conceded that to negotiate an agreement that 
could be regarded well by all stakeholders is very 
difficult. For Gold Ridge landowners, it was more 
of a trial and error over 17 years and the post 
tension Subsidiary Agreement (2006) attests to 
these continuous demands for improvements(see 
grml and grclac, 2006). It should be stated at 
this juncture that the people of the Gold ridge 
area have had previous experience of artisanal 
mining and are therefore conscious of the value 
of gold. As such their understanding of industrial 
mining is influenced by that experience. Moreo-
ver, those living downstream have never had the 
experience of dealing with mining pollution in 
the past and that experience also influenced their 
understanding of industrial mining. 
Methodology
The methodology used in this research is more 
a constructivist/critical realist epistemology. One 
aspect of this position is that knowledge claims 
are always socially situated rather than universa-
listic (Gegeo and Watson-Gegeo, 2002). Critical 
realists argue that people possess knowledge by 
being in the world with elements of a predis-
posed historical, path dependent framework. As 
Proctor (1998) puts it: 
«[k]nowledge to critical realists is neither wholly 
objective nor subjective but is in fact the result of 
interaction between subject and object. […] the 
truth contents of ideas can be compared on a relative 
basis: some (social) explanations are more adequate 
representations of reality than others, though all are, 
by virtue of the dialectic (subject-subject) nature of 
knowledge, always “partial truths”.» (Proctor, 1998: 
361) 
2.  Pseudonyms are used in place of real names as part of a total ethical approach used by this research. 
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bers of tribes and individual households is de-
pendent on the decisions of fathers, brothers 
and uncles. The influences of subsistence living 
and cultural exchanges impacted very much on 
how these people redistribute mineral royal-
ties. There is very little indication of savings or 
reinvestment. Money is shared as soon as it is 
withdrawn from the bank by trustees (Youths, 
5 July 2007). The role of the state in this arena 
is very limited facilitating payments from com-
pany to landowning groups as per the mining 
agreement. The state in this instance would only 
support in terms of organised workshops to as-
sist landowners and other stakeholders identify 
common pitfalls to be addressed. In one of these 
workshops in 2013, the Special Secretary to the 
Prime Minister highlighted that: 
«[…] the Government has seen that landowners of 
Goldridge mining did not invest their royalties in sus-
tainable enterprise after receiving it.» (Osifelo, 2013) 
After the country’s civil uprisings from 1998 
to 2003, efforts to reopen the mine also insti-
gated compensation claims from various groups. 
People asked to be compensated by company 
and the state for damages caused by Ross Mi-
ning, outstanding commitments by the previous 
mining company and government, and assis-
tance to deliver public services and build ame-
nities in the area. Prior to 2000, the Gold Ridge 
Mining Limited (grml), a subsidiary of Ross 
«[they] vote representatives into the Gold Ridge 
Landowners Council (grlc). These councillors 
should report back to members of the tribes. Un-
fortunately, some representatives in the grlc never 
report back to their tribes or villages. One man make 
decisions in Council on behalf of say 5,000+ people.» 
(Obo Obo Men, 4 July 2007)
Tribe members nevertheless are empowered by 
the grlc constitution and could remove their 
representatives before the three years lapse al-
though no such removals have yet been reported. 
The mining agreement and wealth 
redistribution
The Gold Ridge Mine Agreement 1996 laid 
out clearly how royalty, compensations and re-
lated matters are to be paid to landowners and 
the state. Section 6.1 of the Agreement ensured 
that the company pays 1.5% of the gross value 
of gold and silver produced from the mine as the 
mining lease into a Mining Royalty Special Fund 
(1996: 7). Eighty percent (80%) of this will be 
paid to the 16 groups with registered interest on 
the leased area and 20% into a Guadalcanal Pro-
vince Royalty Special Fund after it is subjected 
to a 7.5% government withholding tax. A speci-
fic regulation for the Gold Ridge Mine royalties 
was passed and gazetted in 2011 (sig, 2011). A 
breakdown of how such royalties (80% of 1.5%) 
are to be paid to the respective «tribes» of Gold 
Ridge area is listed below. 
This research uncovered how benefactors of 
such royalty payments use royalty benefits. 
Manegulai, explained that his tribe received ap-
proximately SI$200,000 per payment while the 
other smaller groups receive at least SI$10,000 
per royalty payment (pers. com., 3 July 2007). 
It should be pointed out that agreements for the 
mining campsite and the tailings dam are dif-
ferent from the mining lease agreement which is 
the focus of this paper. 
From the various workshops organised with the 
landowners, their stories revealed that they only 
benefitted from quarterly lease agreement pay-
ments paid by the company. A member of the 
Chacha tribe illustrated how far such monies are 
redistributed at the local level. His tribe receives 
SI$12,000 per payment for a group of around 
twelve families. He claimed that: 
«[…] [they] have 12 passbook accounts which mean 
that we deposit SI$1,000 per passbook. It depends 
on the families whether or not they redistribute their 
shares further to distant relatives.» (Men’s Group, 4 
July 2007)
As most households in the area are headed by 
males, distribution of royalties to female mem-
Gold Ridge 
Landowning Tribe/Line
Percentage of  
Royalty Received
1. Rausere 36.500 %
2. Charana 6.300 %
3. Kaokao 6.300 %
4. Roha 6.300 %
5. Sutahuri 6.300 %
6. Vatuviti 6.300 %
7. Halisia 6.200 %
8. Soroboilo 6.200 %
9. Chacha 5.000 %
10. Sabaha 3.925 %
11. Salasivo 3.225 %
12. Chavuchavu 2.500 %
13. Kaipalipali 1.325 %
14. Koenihao 1.225 %
15. Lasi 1.200 %
16. Sarahi 1.200 %
Total 100.000 %
Table 1. – Gold Ridge Landowners and Royalty 
Shares (Source: Gold Ridge Mine Agreement 
1996))
representation but exclusion of the masses. They 
were therefore required to institutionalise their 
local structures and leadership to cater for this 
new undertaking. The mine ultimately led to the 
establishment of the Malango and Vulolo House 
of Chiefs with a constitution that empowers the 
bigmen3 to negotiate or instigate protests on 
development activities in Central Guadalcanal 
(Malango House of Chiefs, 2004).
Negotiators usually try to derive maximum 
benefits from the mine’s revenue. New local 
organisations and structures emerged in res-
ponse to such expectations from the mine. For 
example, the mine resulted in the increase in 
the number of tribes from around five in pre-
royalty period to sixteen in response to the need 
to redistribute royalties and other benefits. What 
were only clans and «sub-clans» became separate 
tribes in the formal agreement, possibly confu-
sing the kastom4 bases of lineages in that particu-
lar area. The sixteen «tribes» that became parties 
to various agreements are Kaokao, Kaipalipali, 
Roha, Chavuchavu, Lasi, Charana, Chacha, Sa-
rahi, Salasivo, Halisia, Soroboilo, Sobaha, Suta-
huri, Rausere, Vatuviti, Koenihao and Kolobisi 
(Gold Ridge Mine Agreement, 1996: 14) 
Trustees become important individuals and 
councillors are voted in to the grlc (mostly 
based on seniority or literacy levels) to negotiate 
on behalf of the local wantok5 groups. The big-
men therefore become leaders through elections 
and not necessarily based on kastom merits. The 
only individuals who became automatic mem-
bers of grlc were five Principal Landowners. 
The educated and articulate members of wan-
tok groups are elected into grlc. They become 
trustees entrusted to control royalty payments 
and decision making on revenue redistribution 
for their own «tribes». A landowners’ council was 
established with elected members every three 
years (grlcac, 1996: 5)
A youth workshop conducted for this research 
in Obo Obo village reported that council mem-
bers are responsible for negotiating with the 
company. When asked about their understan-
ding of lands leased to company, one respondent 
indicated that: 
«only the Councillors knew about such issues. We 
youths do not know anything about these. To give an 
example, Mr. Kulamuloki is a council representative 
in our village but for some of us, our tribal representa-
tives live far from us.» (Obo Obo Youths, 5 July 2007)
thus the difficulty of getting accurate informa-
tion. A men’s group at Obo Obo also shared the 
same sentiment saying that: 
removed arms from the national armoury and re-
taliated. An estimated 200 people were killed and 
more than 20,000 displaced in the conflict. Seve-
ral peace agreements and reconciliations failed to 
broker sustainable peace. The Townsville Peace 
Agreement (tpa) of 2000 (see sig et al., 2001) 
brought an end to overt fighting but it did not 
stop criminal activities, thus the intervention by 
the Pacific Islands Forum sanctioned Regional 
Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (ramsi) 
in 2003 (see Carter, 2006).
The historical, political and cultural issues des-
cribed here would explain the complex situation 
in which the Gold Ridge mine was established. 
Moreover, it explains the relationship between 
the state, landowners and company and the chal-
lenges such a relationship entail. The fieldwork 
was carried out in a post conflict society where 
huge plantations, mining and other industries 
on Guadalcanal and the Solomon Islands more 
generally were struggling to be reopened. The 
Gold Ridge Mine was closed in 2000 after police 
officers moved out of the mine site and militants 
took control of it and looted/destroyed its faci-
lities. The same could be said for the asset of the 
Solomon Islands Plantations Limited (sipl). In 
this instance, the state leased customary land 
from custom owners and subleased these mine 
and plantations lands to companies. The state 
in most of these undertakings is a middle man 
instead of it being the driver of such develop-
ments. The next section looks at the mining 
agreement, how wealth is redistributed by local 
landowning groups, and how landowners per-
ceive the role of the state. 
Negotiating the Mining Agreement
All issues involving royalties and company ac-
tivities are catered for mostly under the Mines 
and Minerals Act, the Land and Titles Act, 
environmental legislations and the Mines and 
Minerals (Royalty) Regulations (sig, 2011). As 
Gold Ridge lease is on customary land, negotia-
tions had to involve the Guadalcanal Provincial 
Government (gpg), the Commissioner of Lands 
(CoL) and Solomon Islands Government (sig), 
Company, originally the Ross Mining Company 
Limited, later Allied Gold and now Santa Bar-
bara (St Barbara Limited, 2014). The customary 
land owners and people of Gold Ridge formed a 
Charitable Organisation, the Gold Ridge Lan-
downers Council (grlc) to represent them in 
these negotiations (grclac, 2006), a process of 
3.  Bigmen is a term that refers to respected leaders of specific family groups and communities. 
4.  Kastom refers to local knowledge systems, ways of doing things and political organisation. 
5.  The term wantok in this context refers to blood members of an extended family, clan or tribe. 
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become part of the equation. The notion of the 
«enclave economy» (see Le Meur, Ballard et al., 
2013) is fitting in where there is community/
state/company interactions. 
A court case against Ross Mining and Others 
by John Maningelea and Others (1997) will 
demonstrate this incompatibility. Part of the 
claims in this particular case, Maningelea and 
others alleged that:
«[…] the said Agreement [Gold Ridge Mine Agree-
ment] contained no enforceable rights; that the 
compensation there contained was illusory (para-
graph 12); that false representations had been made 
(paras. 15 and 16); allegations of unconstitutionality 
(paras.14-20); and failure to compensate secondary 
right holders (para. 21).» (High Court of Solomon 
Islands, 1997b)
Setting aside all the technical arguments pertai-
ning to this case, the Judge made the following 
statements in his ruling:
«As to the rights of the plaintiffs to challenge the 
validity of the compensation Agreement, it is trite law 
that only parties to the Compensation Agreement 
can seek to enforce the terms of such an Agreement 
or to challenge its validity. It is clear that the Plaintiffs 
are not parties to the said Agreement. All that they 
have alleged in their Statement of Claim is that they 
have customary interests or rights over the said Land. 
At the most, this amounts to a mere assertion because 
in contrast, the Second Defendant relies on the Sub-
Leases granted to it by the Commissioner of Lands 
on or about 12th March 1997. The Commissioner of 
Lands in turn had acquired leases from the registe-
red joint owners of the 25 perpetual estates of the 
said Land. The Plaintiffs therefore face an uphill and 
formidable task to challenge the registered rights and 
interest of those joint owners. The mere fact that they 
allege they have an interest or right over the said land 
does not entitle them per se to challenge the validity 
of the Agreement. They will have to challenge the 
title of the joint owners of the said Land first under 
the provisions of the Land and Titles Act, and only 
if successful, can they in turn challenge the validity 
of the Compensation Agreement. I find with respect 
this claim of the Plaintiff as disclosing no reasonable 
cause of action and should be dismissed.» (High 
Court of Solomon Islands, 1997b: 2) 
The critical point to learn from this court chal-
lenge is the great difficulty of reconciling mo-
dern land law and local people’s understandings 
of landownership and use in Solomon Islands. 
The written agreement and technicalities of mo-
dern laws on land safeguard private property and 
investment promoted by transnational corpora-
tions (tncs) and in the process rural livelihoods 
and subsistence become negligible concerns. It 
is in such situation where the impositions of the 
educated and literate local population on those 
still clinging on to local understandings of land 
that brew hatred and tension in countries like 
Modern laws and local kastom discrepancies 
The idea of trusteeship contradicts local unders-
tandings of collective land ownership (Nanau, 
2008). Collective ownership on Guadalcanal is 
a complex concept whereby certain clans (com-
monly known as mamata) are custodians of 
land used by themselves and other members of 
the community. The mamata, an off shoot of 
the Kema (tribe) has a lot (but not ultimate) 
influence over the overall use of the land. Mem-
bers of the same mamata have equal rights over 
the land but they have specific areas where they 
make their food gardens or homes that are res-
pected as primarily owned by distinct families of 
the same mamata. In a way, there are areas with 
the mamata land those individual and extended 
families (still collectively) of the same clan and 
their associates (children, marriage relatives, etc.) 
have «respected» control over. Other members 
of the clan simply have to ask before using or 
getting things out of that area. Indeed there are 
bundles of rights over land but control over land 
is culturally a collective effort by members of the 
mamata (see Nanau, 2011). When giving titles to 
land, trustees sometimes behave like sole owners 
of tribal land and shares. Allen state: 
«While both state law and customary practice dictate 
that trustees are obliged to share royalties and rents 
with other members of their landowning groups, in 
practice they have not done so.» (2012: 308)
Once communal land is registered under the 
trusteeship of individuals, disputes within these 
local wantok groups can be very difficult to sort. 
This is because the written agreements and titles 
are extremely difficult to challenge under laws 
imposed by modern states. 
These laws do not recognise secondary rights 
by clan members to cultivate, hunt, collection 
of building materials, other common properties, 
and even historic rights in those pieces of land 
(O’Faircheallaigh, 2008: 39). Even maternal and 
paternal rights and privileges to use land are not 
recognised by modern state laws. Modern laws 
and court systems differentiate between prima-
ry and secondary rights while it is not that clear 
cut in local understandings of landownership. 
Maenu’u (1994) and Filer (2006) provide some-
what opposing views that could be the basis for 
further investigations into the communal versus 
individual land ownership perceptions in Mela-
nesia. Suffice to say that in the Solomon Islands, 
there is communal ownership of land but that 
the landowning tribes also respect individual 
members’ ownership of properties built on or 
planted on communal lands. Extractive indus-
tries such as logging and mining complicate 
ownership and use of land in communities as 
the two external entities, the state and company 
state in such arrangements is usually to facilitate 
such meetings where understandings are reached 
between landowners and the company. In certain 
instances, the mous are only an understanding 
between the company and communities and no-
thing to do with the state. It is when such mous 
are not adhered to by the company or violence is 
eminent that landowners usually request the state 
to intervene with the hope of forcing the compa-
ny to meet its agreed obligations to communities. 
At times, landowning groups make submissions 
to the state with the hope that they be listened to 
because of the contribution they make to state re-
venues from mineral resources on their land. An 
example was the submission by the Gold Ridge 
Community and grclac to the Solomon Islands 
Government in April 2007. Some demands in 
this particular submission included the transfer 
to the investment arm, gil the perpetual title 
of the Lunga land on which the first relocation 
village was situated; that sig and grml to build 
houses for those displaced by the mine in two 
new locations of Kovalei and Ravua; the quick 
payment of land premium by government; the 
closure of water sources for the mining plant as it 
was not paid for; the quick transfer of prime site 
land in Honiara as per previous agreements and 
waiver of SI$42,000 stamp duty fee; compen-
sation for loss of crops; immediate payment for 
lost property to people of Malango and Vulolo 
Wards as a consequence of the tensions; and, 
that government give a loan guarantee to Gold 
Ridge Investment Limited (gil) of up to SI$6 
million (grclac, 2007: 1-10). 
Apart from the establishment of gil which 
is yet to undertake business activities, most 
requests and demands to the company and the 
state are unsustainable in the long run. The esta-
blishment of the mine also comes with increased 
expectations that could hardly be met through 
royalties and these gave rise to more demands 
and compensation claims. These resulted in the 
signing of several separate agreement and mous 
between the landowners and other stakeholder 
in the Gold Ridge mine apart from the main mi-
ning agreement, a divide and rule strategy by the 
mining company. This is not peculiar to Gold 
Ridge as it was also the case in Australia and 
Papua New Guinea (O’Faircheallaigh, 2008: 
37). At times this result in companies gaining 
tax relief to provide basic services to areas around 
their operation sites (Callick, 2005: 183). These 
may include building health centres and schools, 
maintaining roads and providing scholarships. 
Since the negotiations and demands mostly 
relate to environment and livelihood concerns, 
it is important to have a discussion on how mo-
dern law and local kastom do not usually com-
plement each other. 
Mining NL owned the mine. During the period 
of unrest and tension, ownership was passed to 
the political risk insurer, American Home Assu-
rance Company (ahac) and Australian Solomon 
Gold (asg) took over the company in 2004 after 
an international tender (asg, 2008: 8). Allied 
Gold bid for and compulsory acquired asg in 
October 2009 and is therefore the 100% owner 
of Gold Ridge in 2010. In September 2012, St 
Barbara Limited again took over from Allied 
Gold and is currently operating the mine (see 
St Barbara Limited, 2014). During the period 
leading up to the reopening of the mine, lan-
downers insisted on the company and the state 
to meet financial and service needs of people in 
the area. This is regarded as a measure of compa-
ny commitment to operate a mutually beneficial 
mine and to appease disagreements among them 
and other parties. The signing of a subsidiary 
agreement in May 2006 attested to additional 
claims for benefits. 
Quite obvious is the perception that the state 
is another external entity. The state is not seen as 
an entity safeguarding the interests of local lan-
downers communities but an institution more 
supportive of company interests. Mr. Kulamu-
loki, a member of the grlc made a telling state-
ment when he lamented that:
«the state should be the referee in the game between 
the mining company and the resource owners. In 
this case, the state also wants to score the ball!» (pers. 
com., 3 July 2007)
Various community and local level organisa-
tions looking after the affairs of Obo Obo com-
munity and surrounding villages like Bemuta 
submitted demands in the form of wish lists to 
both company and the state as urges to reopen 
the mine around 2004 and 2005 were becoming 
apparent. The Obo Obo Community for ins-
tance negotiated and signed a mou with asg for 
the company to retrieve its equipment rescued 
by the villagers before and after the Guadalcanal 
tensions (see Bemuta Community Relocation 
Committee, 2006). grml and asg Limited the-
refore committed themselves to support various 
projects in the village including the restoration of 
a water supply, repair and maintenance of roads, 
support in constructing a kindergarten, church 
and community hall buildings and other sup-
port to women groups and income generating 
projects (mou signed on 9th June 2005). A recent 
example was made by Chovohio Midstream 
Association members in April 2013 for St Bar-
bara to compensate them for activities negati-
vely impacting on the environment (water) and 
livelihood (sto, April 2013). These mous do not 
have time lines and are not legally binding but a 
form of negotiated compensation (see Filer and 
Macintyre, 2006; Banks, 2008)) . The role of the 
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who depended on the river for their daily use 
and those along the coast as they use the sea for 
food on a daily basis. Dunkerley and Hallam 
(1997: 7) earlier draw attention to the possibility 
of tailings entering the large rivers through small 
tributary streams. The Saki case application was 
on the principles of ‘nuisance and trespass’. They 
highlighted that because of their residence along 
and use of the Matapono River, the mine activi-
ties will discharge materials that are dangerous 
and harmful to them. A closer look at Figure 1 
above would explain the vulnerability and inse-
curity sentiments as overflows from tailings and 
waste dams and actual mining upland could po-
tentially find their way through tributaries and 
into the main Tinahulu and Matapono rivers. 
The High Court felt that there was no strong 
evidence to support this claim. In his ruling, the 
Judge, himself a Solomon Islander said:
«With respect, there is little that can be said in sup-
port of the allegations that waste materials from the 
mining operation will be discharged into Matepono 
River. The plaintiffs have failed to show a strong 
probability that the mining operations will cause 
imminent and substantial damage to the Plaintiffs 
property, business or livelihood. Whilst a fear might 
exist in the mind of the plaintiffs, this has not been 
backed up with the necessary causative link between 
the alleged wrongful behaviour of the defendant and 
the harm or damage to the Plaintiffs.» (High Court of 
Solomon Islands, 1997c) 
The requirement by the legal system to come 
up with scientific evidence to support claims 
by ordinary people who may have concerns for 
health and livelihoods in such situations is re-
markable. It would seem that the legal system 
and company work together and are on the same 
line of thought contrary to the precautionary 
principle that state institutions are to protect the 
rights and concerns its citizens. Tensions emerge 
in such situations as the anxieties of people and 
their livelihoods are not accommodated.
Despite these unsuccessful legal bids to seek ad-
ditional benefits or redress from the legal system, 
evidence later showed that the mining company 
was not fault proof as earlier indicated. A leak-
age or overflow from the pipes from the tailings 
dam to the water reticulation pool found its way 
to the Tinahulu River (this joins with the Mat-
apono River) and fish died in great numbers in 
the late 1990s. Indeed an earlier environmental 
assessment by researchers from Monash Univer-
sity (Dunkerley and Hallam, 1997) had indi-
cated these dangers in their report. Their sum-
mary is that the high rainfall experienced in the 
Solomon Islands over recent years coupled with 
the mine’s location in a deeply dissected, high 
altitude site meant that three major problems 
are highly likely. They are: (i) overburden run 
off into the river systems, (ii) Potential overflow 
others raised among other things the threat of 
waste and other materials discharged from the 
mining operations into the Matapono River 
(High Court of Solomon Islands, 1997c). The 
case by Roni and Thughuvoda was aimed at see-
king additional financial benefits and compen-
sations from the proceeds of the mine beyond 
what was signed in the Gold Ridge Mine agree-
ment of 1996 (High Court of Solomon Islands, 
1997a). Gatu’s case focuses more on pressuring 
the Gold Ridge Mining Company to obtain 
electricity supply from the Lunga Hydro Power 
Consortium (High Court of Solomon Islands, 
1998), another Australian firm. As they turned 
out, Gatu’s case was dismissed on 17th Septem-
ber 1998, Roni/Tghughuvoda proceedings were 
discontinued 3rd October 1997 as they entered 
into written Agreements (known as «Deed of 
Release») with Ross Mining (Solomon Islands) 
Limited and a later application to revive these 
proceedings were dismissed by the High Court 
(High Court of Solomon Islands, 1998). 
The Australian Law Firm, Slater and Gordon 
ended up battling it out with Ross Mining (si) 
Limited and Gold Ridge Mining Limited (High 
Court of Solomon Islands, 1998). These were 
two Australian companies with interests in Solo-
mon Islands. A bigman of the major landowning 
group (Rausere) of the mining lease joined the 
opposition spearheaded by Slater and Gordon 
until he decided to drop the case and allow the 
mine to continue. The bigman withdrew his 
support to Slater and Gordon’s case after reve-
lations that his counterpart had used up subs-
tantial amounts of money for himself. He also 
withdrew the second case with allegations that 
the same person obtained more money from the 
foreign company (Nanau, 2008). The important 
point to make here is that interests of foreign 
and international companies are sometimes 
played out at the local level using local trustees 
and bigmen as exemplified here. Elements of 
global and local elite interests are sometimes 
aligned in company undertakings giving rise to 
vulnerability, insecurity and intra-wantok ins-
tability at the local level. I have dealt with this 
causality between the local/global coalitions and 
local people’s vulnerabilities in detail elsewhere 
(see Nanau, 2008, 2011). 
Environment and livelihood risks 
The nature of mining gave rise to environmen-
tal concerns both in the area and beyond. The 
Saki case above was one of the legal challenges 
against the mining company when it started 
operations in 1996. The fear was that harmful 
discharges to the Matapono River could affect 
the livelihoods of the many people downstream 
The mda’s stance is that grml poses health and 
environmental risks to their livelihoods. Accor-
ding to the men of Tumurora, mda is within the 
mining zone and is a legal entity looking after 
the concerns of Tumurora and Pituloki com-
munities. They insisted that these communities 
did not receive support from the mining com-
pany despite the potential irreversible impacts 
the mine has on their river and food garde-
ning areas. The Association was established to 
secure compensation for the damages the mine 
has already done to their river. They indicated 
that road maintenance was the only thing the 
mining company assisted the community with 
(Tumurora men, 13 May 2007). mda was thus 
established as an environmental concern body 
monitoring the effects of the mine downstream 
while also acting as a lobbyist for compensation 
on environmental degradation and effects on 
livelihoods.
Apart from the above 1998 civil case, three 
other civil cases were brought against the mi-
ning company. These were civil case 59 in 1997 
known as the «Gatu proceedings»; 60 in 1997 
referenced as the «Roni/Thughuvoda procee-
dings»; and 169 of 1997 referenced as the «Saki 
proceedings». The case by Samuel Saki and 
the Solomon Islands. In many instances, new 
property laws and institutions contradict local 
people’s ways of seeing things and frustrations 
turn into violent disputes and conflicts. It is 
in situations where people can no longer stand 
up to safeguard their local understandings and 
rights to land and what they genuinely believe 
that result in tensions and conflicts. It should 
also be emphasized that because modern laws 
are written and local stories of landownership 
in local communities are orally kept, knowledge 
based on the written word always have the upper 
hand. 
Apart from the confusions where two different 
sets of perceiving land converge, there are also di-
sagreements between land owners and company 
on the provisions of the original mining agree-
ment, royalty and compensation payments and 
on the adverse impacts of mining on the envi-
ronment. Concern for environmental pollution 
and negative impacts on livelihoods of people 
living along the Matapono River and the tailings 
dam gave way to the formation of the Matapono 
Downstream Association (mda). Membership 
and influence of mda start where the two rivers 
meet as shown in Figure 2 below.
Figure 2. – Gold Ridge Mine on Guadalcanal (adapted from asg Limited, 2007)
Tinahulu River
Matapono River
MDA Starts here
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«Lunga and Obo Obo are better off but Taotaona 
people accepted cash so they “ate” it all up (i.e. spent 
it all without building their homes). Obo Obo villa-
gers were given SI$20,000 each to build their own 
homes while Lunga villagers were built houses cos-
ting SI$25,000 by the company.» 
The houses were bigger and better equipped 
at Obo Obo compared to those built at Lunga. 
This is the usual story of people where mineral 
extraction and subsequent compensations and 
royalties are paid. Among the Ipilli people who 
«hosts» the Porgera mine PNG for instance, the 
influx of benefits also resulted in changed lifes-
tyles but also with social disorders like increased 
domestic violence and drunken sprees in urban 
centres. Moreover, most of their money were 
spent on store-bought foodstuff like tinned fish 
and rice and on big budget items like pick-up 
trucks (Golub, 2006: 269). Figure 4 below gives 
an indication of the types of buildings built 
at the Obo Obo relocation village by villagers 
themselves with materials costs borne by the 
company.
Despite the modern corrugated iron homes, 
moving these people into permanent communi-
ties close to each other meant that there are seri-
ous health and hygiene considerations. It could 
be confidently argued from observation that the 
people of the mining area are used to living in 
smaller hamlets and move around frequently in 
the search for gold. However, their relocation to 
a permanent village, with permanent building 
posed health and hygiene concerns. The impor-
tance of pigs in status building and the local area’s 
«Lou» feasts saw the breeding of pigs everywhere 
in the village which also raised concerns for 
health and hygiene in the community. All work-
shops held in the village recognised this weak-
ness. However, they all blamed village leadership 
weakness as a cause of lack of village cleanliness 
controls without taking the initiative to tackle it. 
The most notable issue in relation to migra-
tion, movement and resettlement is the ten-
sion it brought about. This is more so for the 
relocation village at Lunga than Obo Obo. The 
settlers from Gold Ridge and the people of the 
areas in which they were being resettled (Belaha/
Malango) share the same language, kastom and 
most share membership in the same «line» or 
clan. Indeed, the original inhabitants receive 
cash benefits from their relatives and trustees of 
the Gold Ridge Mine and many young people of 
Belaha and Malango were employed by the mi-
ning company. Despite these commonalities and 
links, resettlement resulted in disagreements and 
conflicts with host communities. Stewart and 
Strathern (2005) claimed that domination or 
subjection within new environments is a com-
mon theme of diasporas in the Pacific islands 
through history. They stated that:
level of rainwater raised the level of water in the 
dam. The threat was already highlighted in the 
report by Dunkerley and Hallam in 1997 and 
the Saki case mentioned above. The government 
refused to issue the de-watering licence because 
waste water recycling and treatment plant was 
not working (sibc, 24 April 2013). They instead 
asked the company to repair the system and treat 
the water before the application can be conside-
red. It was later revealed in a report produced by 
three Solomon Islands scientists and communi-
cated by the minister that: 
«the rise in the water level of the Gold Ridge tailings 
dam is not due to rainwater but the company’s mine 
wastes.» (Rakai, 2013) 
The state therefore asked the company to re-
pair the recycling and treatment plant after the 
report. In previous incidents, company put to-
gether scientific papers and evidence to support 
their cause while the ordinary people whose lives 
are affected remained at the mercy of the state 
and company enforced through a legal system 
operating on the bases of formal property rights 
and lack of a precautionary criterion as a sustai-
nability principle. 
Experiences in relocation villages
Since the mining of Gold Ridge was organi-
sationally globalised, negotiations on compen-
sation payments and relocating and resettling 
people occurred concurrently. The mining re-
sulted in the resettlement of people away from 
their original homes. A total of 120 families had 
to be relocated to give way for the gold mine. 
As it turned out, 95 families were relocated to 
a government land (449 hectares) at Lungga 
while 25 families were resettled at Obo Obo, 
also known as Jericho village or Road Head 
(Obo Obo Men, 4 July 2007). These families 
were moved from their original localities, an 
environment that is typical of Solomon Islands 
highlands without mosquitoes to the Lunga area 
that is infested with malaria mosquitoes. The 95 
families were so far from the river and mining 
area that gold panning is no longer a livelihood 
option. Moreover, the types of houses they now 
have to live in are different from those they were 
used to. They were moved to permanent and lar-
ger villages compared to their original lifestyle 
of shifting around in the same area and in the 
process build new homes. 
Interviewees proudly told me that the people 
in the Obo Obo relocation village are better off. 
Before the mining only one person owned a per-
manent house but now all 25 families have per-
manent homes. They also claimed that:
Figure 3. – Impact of Matapono River sedimentation on cocoa plantations (2007, picture Gordon Leua 
Nanau)
zens in these communities rely on the state and 
its agents to assist them convey to the company 
the disruptions to livelihood and ultimately re-
quest for compensation on their behalf. 
A recent cyanide leakage from a broken pipe 
in late May 2011 was kept a secret by the min-
ing company until a local newspaper reported 
it. The spillage was alleged to continue for more 
than 5 hours and the effects to humans and en-
vironment are yet to be determined by respon-
sible authorities (Namosuaia, 2011). A former 
Premier of Guadalcanal Province and leader of 
mda commented: 
«our people demand Gold Ridge Mining Limited 
(grml) an explanation as to why our communities 
were not informed and being consulted about the 
incident when it first occurred.» (Namosuaia, 2011) 
Throughout 2012 and 2013, many more com-
plaints on the company’s disregard for the envi-
ronment were aired. This was not helped by the 
rapid change of hands in company ownership as 
St Barbara Ltd acquired Allied Gold in Septem-
ber 2012. Secrecy, opacity and monopoly of in-
formation also give us an idea of the relationship 
between people, company and the state. The 
company has monopoly over information about 
the company activities and deficiencies. 
In April 2013, St Barbara applied for a de-wate-
ring licence to release the tailings dam water into 
the river with the justification that the unusual 
from the tailings dams, and (ii) Potential pollu-
tion of the river system with cyanide following 
heavy rains (Dunkerley and Hallam, 1997: 2). 
Environmental concerns are huge for people 
especially those living along the Matapono river. 
At Tumurora, stories of hazards from the mine 
always emerge in village workshops, especially 
when discussing threats to downstream commu-
nities. A piece of evidence they pointed to was 
the increased sedimentation of the river. Ero-
sions due to loosening soil by mining up at Gold 
Ridge, resulted in increased sedimentation and 
the diversion of flood waters into their food gar-
dens and cocoa plantations. The consequence is 
damage especially to cocoa trees and food gardens 
along the river beds. As Figure 3 below show, the 
increased sedimentation subsequently diverged 
flood water into cocoa and coconut plantations 
and after months of water table remaining high, 
vast areas of cocoa trees were destroyed, affecting 
one of the most important sources of income for 
many families at Tumurora.
These were reported to the Ministries responsi-
ble for mines and environment and they did vis-
it and carried out assessments. Evidence on the 
ground showed that sedimentation is a real threat 
and other environmental concerns raised are 
from people’s actual experiences. If what is seen 
can be regarded as evidence and stories of people 
who experienced these changes can be accepted, 
then environmental concerns and threats are real 
and related to company activity upstream. Citi-
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witnessed people carrying cartons and bags of 
processed foodstuff in their various makeshift 
houses. My host explained that most of these 
people deposited their gold with the store owner 
and as soon as food stuff from Honiara got in, 
they collected these from the shop based on the 
value of gold deposited. He further claimed that 
people of Gold Ridge area spent their money on 
beer and food as they rarely make food gardens 
and that the children are now more interested in 
processed foodstuff.
These people previously relied almost entirely 
on monies from alluvial gold panning to support 
their daily needs food supplies. The (re)establish-
ment of the mine meant that they lose out on 
their means of income and would therefore look 
at alternative sources apart from the quarterly 
royalty payments received by the 16 «lines». The 
mining agreement realised this problem so deli-
berately included a provision that decorated the 
agreement. It says: 
«grlm may, in its absolute discretion, permit the 
continuation of traditional gold panning outside the 
Mining Lease in certain circumstances and subject to 
legal, safety and health and environmental require-
ments and may provide assistance to traditional gold 
panners with gold smelting and the sale of panned 
gold. Any such assistance will be subject to nego-
tiation between grml and the persons concerned.» 
(grml and grclac, 2006: 7)
This looks good on paper but has never been 
permitted.
The need for formal education and employ-
ment are becoming more visible as people now 
have to look for alternative sources of income. As 
indicated elsewhere in this paper, the workshops 
for this research saw lack of education as negati-
vely impacting their new lifestyle. They pointed 
out that landowners are only employed in areas 
like field labourers, security guards, environment 
manual workers and a bit of catering given to the 
Obo Obo community as part of their unders-
tanding with the company (Men’s Group, 4 July 
2007). The emphasis on formal education is also 
indicated by the establishment of a kindergarten 
by the villagers in a community hall built with 
assistance from the mining company. The com-
munity lamented that the Guadalcanal tensions 
put a halt to the progress made at the Lunga 
relocation village which saw a good number of 
their children attending secondary schools then. 
As that group of students was disturbed by the 
tensions and the new relocation villages have just 
been built, it will take time before their children 
are educated to a level where they can work at 
the mine. The point is royalties will not sustain 
the livelihoods of Obo Obo villagers in the long 
run and education for wage labour is an option 
that they now have to pursue. 
to keep up their livelihood needs. The level of 
formal education there is low and people there 
openly acknowledged this deficiency. Resett-
lements resulted in parents quickly realising 
the importance of formal education. Children 
were actually progressing to high schools since 
relocated to the Lunga area but the Guadalca-
nal tensions put an end to this slow but deter-
mined progress (Obo Obo Men, 4 July 2007). 
To survive in their new settlements, the locals 
would need formal academic qualifications and 
skills to compete for jobs in the mine despite the 
hypothetical allocation of 80% of jobs for lan-
downers. In one of his media releases prior to the 
opening of the mine, grml’s chief executive, es-
timated that 400 to 500 jobs will be created once 
the company fully operates but acknowledging 
that 80% of these would be for Gold Ridge lan-
downers. He reported that in early 2007, they 
were only employing around 205 locals at the 
mine site and the Head Office (Mamu, 2007: 1). 
Unfortunately, the mine requires technical skills 
gained through formal education of which the 
local people of Gold Ridge neglected for years. 
Youths at Obo Obo confirmed that employment 
for them is lacking due to very scarce education 
qualifications and skills relevant for company 
employment. 
Consequently, local people there are only em-
ployed in areas like field service, security, envi-
ronment, and manual work. Only catering was 
given to the community as it is included in a 
mou with the company (Obo Obo Youths, 5 
July 2007). Note that women were unable to do 
most of the jobs in the mine because of gendered 
demarcated roles on Guadalcanal. For instance, 
providing security or driving heavy mining ma-
chines are regarded a man’s job, although this 
is slowly changing. Moreover, women of Obo 
Obo were previously not encouraged to attend 
school. The women of the surrounding commu-
nity were given the opportunity to cook for wor-
kers working on the mine site but these are short 
term employment opportunities, where women 
organize themselves in groups for a period of 
several weeks before another group takes over. 
Locals, particularly women and youths were not 
accessing mining jobs as they lacked formal edu-
cation, thus, distant mineral poor villages and 
provinces took advantage of office and other 
technical jobs. 
The relocated population were dependent on 
food from shops. Those who still have access 
to gold panning outside of the lease area pride 
themselves with their reliance on processed food 
and their desire for such foodstuff compared to 
local diets. On the day I was interviewing one 
of the principal landowners at Magazine settle-
ment, loads of trucks were unloading foodstuff 
for a local trade store. These included sugar, rice, 
noodles, salt, canned food and alcohol. I also 
the historical context outlined above, mining 
in the Solomon Islands is only a small part of 
the tensions that has a longer history before the 
mine was opened. 
It should be noted that on resumption of ope-
rations at the mine, those who were resettled 
at Lunga refused to return there because of the 
problems explained. They instead opted for the 
company to company to build two alternative 
relocation villages closer to their original at Gold 
Ridge but outside the mine lease. A total of 287 
houses were built in these two relocation sett-
lements and people moved into them in 2011 
and 2012 (Godfrey, Battista et al., 2011: 591). 
It is still too early to assess the experiences of 
residents in these new villages. One thing that 
is eminently clear though is the difficulty of ac-
cessing water for day to day use. Currently, the 
company hire water tankers to deliver water to 
all these houses on a daily basis. It is an expensive 
exercise and one that needs attention. 
Employment opportunities and frustrations
The lifestyle of the «displaced» villagers before 
and after being resettled was that of dependence 
on gold panning, processed food and very 
limited subsistence food gardening. As such, 
the Obo Obo people had to look for alterna-
tive jobs within the mining company or return 
to the panning region for occasional panning 
«[m]emory, history, and the emotions are all in-
volved in the construction of cultural selves in new 
places.» (Stewart and Strathern, 2005: 206) 
People relocating to Lunga faced similar re-
sentments from Belaha people. This was seen 
through occasional brawls and arguments. This 
came to its peak during the country’s civil upri-
sing that forced those who resettled at Lunga to 
return their original homes for security reasons. 
The Belaha people took the opportunity to 
damage homes vacated by their wantoks. Chief 
Manegulai put it succinctly: 
«They did not respect people from Belaha. Belaha 
people also disliked Gold Ridge people. After the ten-
sions, they did not ask us but removed and sold our 
houses. Moro people6 did not respect other people 
of Guadalcanal (they associate Moro as God). Had 
they understood this, and we reconciled things would 
have improved.» (Mangulai, pers. com., 4 July 2007) 
The important point to note is that, move-
ment, settlement and migration is a critical fac-
tor for social instability in the Solomon Islands. 
The Gold Ridge settlers experience showed that 
it is more of an overarching issue and should 
not be based entirely on inter-wantok antago-
nisms and assessments. The relocation villages 
and experiences with host relatives and wantoks 
had helped us understand this issue a bit more. 
Intra-wantok relationships through a share of 
royalties cannot compensate relatives to happily 
accept «displaced» people. As can be seen from 
6.  A reference to members of the «Gaena’alu Movement» that is influential in South and Central Guadalcanal. The 
movement promotes the idea of development that respects and safeguards their local way of life and organization (i.e. 
kastom). 
Figure 4. – Houses at Obo Obo relocation village (2007, picture Gordon Leua Nanau)
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and the lack of investment mentality on the part 
of landowning groups meant that long term 
improvements through investments are not very 
promising. Communities continue to look up to 
the company and the state for financial benefits 
and services. Without proper investments for 
future sustainable revenues after the mine, sus-
tainable and improved livelihoods will remain a 
distant dream for such communities.
On the question of the impacts of royalty pay-
ments, various licence fees, and rents from extrac-
tive industries impacted on the lives of people at 
Obo Obo and Tumurora, certain observations 
were made. With the establishment of the mine, 
the inhabitants of the area formalised local ins-
titutions in an effort to deal with negotiations, 
thus the establishment of the Gold Ridge Lan-
downers Council, the Gold Ridge Downstream 
Association, the Kolobisi Downstream Associa-
tion and other similar groupings. It has also re-
sulted in the appointment of trustees as owners 
of lands leased; a movement away from collective 
ownership of customary land by tribes as explai-
ned above. The expectations and redistribution 
of various payments from the mine also resulted 
in court challenges and disputes both with local 
and international «interested» parties. Royalties 
and the mine’s infrastructure also meant that 
the livelihood patterns and activities of resett-
led communities also changed. For instance, 
resettlement increased the importance of formal 
education with the hopes for locals to secure 
company and state employment. The mine has 
therefore impacted the lifestyles and outlook of 
landowners to the extent that in the long term, 
they have to look at alternative livelihoods, away 
from royalties and gold panning. 
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ments and courts impact or safeguard local 
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for the next royalty payments to mature. It is 
from this vantage point that livelihoods are not 
sustainable for the relocated population. Royal-
ties are good for the time being but with the atti-
tude and trend in which royalties were used, it 
is unsustainable and could become a lost oppor-
tunity as soon as the mine stops. This is because 
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Conclusion
The above discussions are based on the expe-
riences of local indigenous Guadalcanal popula-
tions who are hosts of and are directly displaced 
by the mining operations at Gold Ridge. The 
account touches on people’s expectations, the 
benefits obtained from the mine, frustrations, 
and fears. Being the first mine in the country, 
among communities that have had previous 
gold panning experience, their stories could as-
sist potential mines and host communities to be 
more strategic in the redistribution of mineral 
proceeds with commitment to improve people’s 
livelihoods. More importantly, it provides the 
first narrative on mine/community/state rela-
tionships in the Solomon Islands. 
The research question whether royalties from 
company activities could be agents for impro-
ving community livelihoods and discourage 
vulnerability, insecurity and instability must be 
answered. The bold answer would be «yes». Un-
fortunately, this potentially powerful agent for 
improved livelihoods cannot be prompted be-
cause of two basic reasons. First is the basic fact 
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of the company. The mine agreement prescribed 
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